The U.S. government synthetic rubber program, 1941-1955 : an examination in search of lessons for current energy technology commercialization projects by Samuelson, Paul Reid
Energy Laboratory
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SYNTHETIC RUBBER PROGRAM
1941-1955
An Examination in Search of Lessons
For Current Energy Technology Commercialization
Projects
by
Paul R. Samuelson
Working Paper MIT-EL 76-027WP
November, 1976
PREPARED FOR THE UNITED STATES
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
Under Contract No. E(49-18) 2295
Task Order 6
"This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United
States government. Neither the United States nor the United States ERDA,
nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors,
or their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes
any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed,
or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights."
iPREFACE
This paper was written as a background paper in support of the M.I.T.
Energy Policy Study Group's report, "Government Support for the Commerciali-
zation of New Energy Technologies; An Analysis and Exploration of the Issues"
(M.I.T. Energy Laboratory Report MIT-EL 76-009, October, 1976). Like the
other background papers, it examines a specific government program, historical
or current, to draw lessons for present energy policies.
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THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SYNTHETIC RUBBER PROGRAM, 1941-1955
An Examination in Search of Lessons
For Current Energy Technology Commercialization Projects
In 1941, the U.S. government initiated the emergency construction of
government-owned but privately operated synthetic rubber plants. Under war-
time conditions of scarce raw materials, capital equipment and labor supply,
plants were constructed in four years' time with an annual production capa-
city of one million long tons of synthetic rubber, at an investment of $700
million. In 1954, after nine years of postwar government ownership and pri-
vate operation of the majority of synthetic rubber plants, the government
finally transferred (through outright sales) its ownership of plants to pri-
vate companies. Recently this experience has been cited as a model for an
American response to the control of imported petroleum by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries.*
I will attempt to present in this paper the potential lessons, for planners
of new government-sponsored industries, which may be derived from the govern-
ment's synthetic rubber experience. Particular parallels exist between past
conditions in synthetic rubber and current conditions for synthetic fuels:
(1) Synthetic rubber production was initiated to replace a natural raw
material in decreasing supply. Alternative energy sources--parti-
cularly synthetic sources--are substitutes for major natural raw
materials, especially natural gas and oil.
*
For example: Bueche, A.M. "Synthetic Rubber in World War II." Science.
Volume 191 (March 12, 1976).
2(2) Private companies in 1941 possessed the technical knowledge of the
rubber production process, but perceived no immediate profit op-
portunity for large-scale production. Although technical informa-
tion is now available, it is the economics of the situation which
seem to prevent large-scale private investments in alternative
energy sources.
(3) The synthetic rubber industry actually consisted (until 1955) of
four major rubber formulations with six main types of production.
Large firms with experience in rubber, oil, and chemical production
were involved in various combinations of horizontal and vertical in-
tegration of markets. Similarly, production of synthetic fuels would
involve a variety of processes and end-products.
(4) New government agencies were established (and transformed over time)
to ensure synthetic rubber production and transfer ownership to in-
dustrial firms. Alternative energy technologies may be expected to
combine government and private operation and financing.
However, particular differences also exist between synthetic rubber then
and synthetic fuels now:
(1) In 1941, the U.S. was threatened with a nearly total curtailment
of its natural rubber supplies from the Far East; Beg-inning in
1942, the U.S. could not import as much rubber as it needed--at any
price. Currently, the U.S. must tolerate the insecurity of a pos-
sible second oil embargo from the Middle East, but it may import as
much oil as it wants at monopolistic prices. There is now no abso-
lute physical shortage of oil.
(2) The vast majority of people in the U.S. supported the emergency
mobilization of government and private industry resources to produce
the output necessary to win World War II. At present, more conflicting
opinions exist concerning the government's support of private industry
production of energy. A plan for massive government support of new
energy technologies could not be expected to receive unambiguous pop-
ular support.
In using a complete past record of government and private industry ex-
perience, one may easily tend to ignore differences of opinion and factional
debate, and concentrate exclusively on courses actually chosen and outcomes
achieved. I will try to uncover, wherever possible, the questions asked, al-
ternatives considered, and contemporary evaluations of the phases of the syn-
thetic rubber program during its long history. Therefore, I plan to outline
3in chronological order the essential facts from 1940-1954 about the synthetic
rubber industry. With these facts as a base, in the subsequent six sections
of this paper I will examine and derive lessons from specific areas of govern-
ment decision making. First, goals were formulated and reformulated over time.
Second, different structures of government organization were created to imple-
ment into actual operation previously determined goals. Third, financing
schemes and cost accounting procedures were developed for operation companies.
Fourth, numerous incentive plans were considered and some implemented to en-
courage efficient production and later sale of plants. Fifth, patent proce-
dures and investments in research and development changed with the increased
development of the industry. Sixth, analyses of the competitive environment
and government actions within markets were committed to the establishment of a
competitive private industry. Finally, I will place into perspective the
critical lessons of the synthetic rubber experience.
1. The Essential Facts About the Synthetic Rubber Program
The wartime record of total industrial expansion supplies a context to
2the building of the rubber industry. From 1939 to 1945, government investment
supported a 25% increase in aggregate production, while private investment
supported a 12 1/2% increase. Thus, the bulk of large production projects was
financed by the government. In particular, expansion of synthetic rubber
facilities was dwarfed by expansion of aircraft, shipbuilding, guns, and ex-
plosive industries. Generally, investment decisions were not based on private
calculations of current market value, but were rather centrally planned
Superscripts indicate references listed at the end of the paper.uperscripts indicate references listed at the end of the paper.
4government imperatives for necessary production. Important questions were
not concerned with what to do, or how much to do, but rather with how to get
it done. Synthetic rubber supply, although expanding dramatically like other
raw material supplies, had the distinct feature of replacing natural supply
sources almost entirely and very abruptly lost after 1941. The Baruch Report
of 1942 declared synthetic rubber an essential good for the war campaign and
3domestic economy.
Natural rubber had a history in the 1920's and 1930's of wildly fluctua-
ting prices (a high of 80¢/lb. in 1925 and a low of less than 10¢/lb. in 1932)
and sporatic efforts to control supply. In 1934 the International Rubber
Regulation Agreement was signed to maintain "fair prices" for "efficient" pro-
ducers--goals difficult to define given the two-tiered structure of producers
(large plantations and native firms) and their different national origins
(although 9/10 of natural rubber came from Ceylon, India, and Malaysia). To
create a government stockpile of rubber, the Rubber Reserve Company was es-
tablished in 1940 as the single direct buyer for the government of crude rubber
from foreign markets. This organization, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, negotiated directly with the International Rubber Regu-
lation Committee (which controlled 98% of the world's natural rubber supply),
to increase the shipments (determined by quota) to the U.S. Clearly, an or-
ganization under the immediate authority of the U.S. government (as opposed
to private industry) was required to effectively acquire stockpiles of rubber
for future national security (not current commercial) needs. Imports rose
from 500,000 annual long tons in 1939 to 1,029,000 long tons in 1941 and then
fell to negligible amounts after the Japanese capture of the Far East. Stocks
increased to a peak of 528,000 in 1941 and fell to a precarious low in 1943
of 140,000 long tons.
5Five major types of synthetic rubber had been developed by 1940, as
shown in Figure 1.
1) Buna-S was developed in Germany during the 1920's and 1930's as a
general purpose rubber produced from butadiene (76%) and styrene (24%).
Butadiene, used exclusively for Buna-S rubber, could be produced from
petroleum or grain alcohol. Styrene, possessing multiple uses
(particularly later in plastics), could be produced from coal, petro-
leum, and alcohol.
2) Buna-N was at that time a special purpose rubber, used in cable covers
and tank linings.
3) Butyl developed by Standard Oil of New Jersey was used for inner
tubes and other special uses and produced from petroleum and turpen-
tine.
4) Neoprene was developed in the 1920's by DuPont for specialized uses
such as linings and hoses, and produced from salt, sulphur, lime,
and coke.
5) Thiokol (not shown on chart) was produced from multiple raw materials
for limited specialized uses.
Private production of synthetic rubber in the U.S. from 1939 to 1941 was
extremely limited, despite technical feasibility and, presumably, some antici-
pation (at least in 1941) of impending shortages of natural rubber.
U.S. Private Output
(long tons)
2,500
4,500
20,000
Estimated German Output
(long tons)
14,000
41,000
Estimated Russian
Output (long tons)
80,000
115,000
The private U.S. economy lagged sharply behind the national production levels
of Germany and Russia. Private prices were high for the specialized rubbers--
$.65 - $.75/lb. for neoprene and $.35 - $.70/lb. for thiokol until fixed war-
time prices of $.225/lb. for natural rubber and $.185/lb. for synthetic.
1939
1940
1941
1943
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6FIGURE 1
SYNTHETIC RUBBER MANUFACTURE: RAW MATERIALS TO FINISHED PRODUCT
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7In 1944, a comparison was made by the Office of the Rubber Director
(War Production Board) of actual and intended capacities (by the 1942
5
Baruch committee):
1944 Critical Material Intended % Capacity Actual % Capacity
Buna-S 80% 85%
Butyl 10 7
Neoprene 5 7
Thiokol 5 0
There were indeed significant differences between planning and execution.
In particular, butadiene produced from alcohol accounted suprisingly for
83% of the supply in 1943 and 80% of the supply through 1944. According to
Robert Solo:
The 42,000 tons of scheduled butadiene capacity which government
officials were forced very late in the day by the threat of Con-
gressional rebellion to allot to the alcohol-based processes was
treated by them as a bone thrown to the howling political dogs,
but insofar as the need for synthetic rubber was concerned, it was
that alcohol-based butadiene capacity that carried the nation
through the critical phases of the war.
The plants were located predominately in the East Coast industrial
sites. Significantly, plants were not built in remote areas requiring mi-
gration of people and development of supporting services. The $700 million
investment could be broken down into the following aggregate percentages for
production facilities: 50% butadiene, 25% Buna-S plants, 8% butyl, 11%
styrene.
After World War II, under the direction of the Inter-Agency Policy
Committee on Rubber, production of synthetic rubber was continued, with the
mandatory use of synthetic rubber in certain materials, and with price con-
8trols. Between 1946 and 1949, plants above "national security needs" with
25% of the total wartime capacity were sold (many with contracts stipulating
the rates of production or non-production) for less than 50% of the govern-
ment investment to date in those plants. A limited number of these plants
(particularly styrene and neoprene plants) continued to operate privately
from 1946 on. The Rubber Act of 1948 declared the following policy:
It is declared to be the policy of the Congress that the security
interests of the United States can and will be best served by the
development within the United States of a free, competitive syn-
thetic rubber industry. In order to strenghthen national security
through a sound industry, it is essential that Government ownership
of production facilities, Government production of synthetic rubber,
regulations requiring mandatory use of synthetic rubber and patent
pooling be terminated whenever consistent with national security as
provided in this Act.
However, only beginning in 1949 did the competitive position of the
7
synthetic rubber relative to natural rubber strenghthen. Compelling needs
for national security (in anticipation of another war), a violent upsurge
in natural rubber prices (due to troubles in the Far East), and technical
improvements (leading to decreased synthetic rubber costs and increased
quality), prompted serious consideration of sale of all plants (outlined
8in the Steelman Report of 1950) , but was delayed by the start of the Korean
War. The Rubber Disposal Act of 1953 ordered the sale of all Government-
owned synthetic rubber plants with the four goals of: 1) fostering the in-
terests of national security, 2) establishing a free competitive industry,
3) protecting the interests of small businesses, and 4) obtaining full fair
market values of facilities.9
With the notable exception of a production complex in California (in-
cluding styrene, butadiene and buna-S plants) purchased by Shell Chemical,
virtually all the plants were purchased (mostly in full, but several in
9partnership) by the current operating companies without competitive bids
from other companies.
Finally, the Attorney General in 1961 reported on the synthetic in-
8
dustry's competitive structure. At this time, synthetic rubber dominated
natural and reclaimed rubber in production, consumption, and stocks. Ex-
cept for the addition of two new types of synthetic rubber--N-type, and
Polybutadiene and Polyisoprine--the list of synthetic rubber companies in
1961 greatly resembled the list of original operators in 1944.
To summarize, the synthetic rubber industry during the twenty year
period from 1941 to 1961 exhibited: 1) continuous operation without trans-
fers between companies of the majority of plants, 2) increased market
share relative to natural and reclaimed rubber, and 3) stable growth of all
sectors (excluding thiokol which terminated in 1943) and the addition of two
new technologies (after 1955).
2. Goal Formulation
Goals and program planning were evolved throughout the history of the
synthetic rubber program. Occasionally general goals were set, merely ar-
ticulating the problems perceived at the time. At other times specific goals
were set, providing definite production targets and guidelines for judging
program success. In 1940, the first initiative to build synthetic rubber
plants originated from the Army and Navy Munitions Board. Their concern was
focused on national security, not consumer interests, and on anticipated,
not current, needs. They wanted plants in part for the output of synthetic
rubber, in part as models for future construction needs. The plants' use-
fulness was based not on current conditions but grimly forecasted future
conditions of war: "Some characterized it in 1940 as a 'battleship policy';
10
since battleships serve no purpose in peacetime, but cannot be done without
,,1l
in war."
Goals were fomulated prior to real needs. In fact, the investments in
synthetic rubber were not justified under current supply conditions (i.e.,
1940). Their value was judged within the worst possible scenario of
events (perhaps vaguely comparable to a complete Arab oil embargo today of
the U.S.). Significantly, questions raised then about synthetic rubber re-
semble questions about synthetic fuels today:
1) What types of rubber to produce?
2) What size of production units?
3) What kinds of plants most easily implemented?
4) What uncertainties in patents?
5) What about obsolescence of plants?
6) What effects of public efforts on private investments?
The Baruch Committee, a high priority and carefully selected committee,
filed a report in September, 1942, which had a strong impact.1 2 They first
defined the nature of the rubber shortage--not enough rubber in absolute
terms, and not enough at the right place and right time. Then, after exami-
ning all available production, distribution, and conservation techniques,
they advocated an integrated plan of 1) construction of synthetic plants,
2) rationing of consumer tires (aided by gasoline rationing), 3) conser-
vation and development of existing natural rubber supplies (expanding the
reclamation of rubber and guayule plantations). Efforts were made to in-
tegrate and control supply and demand. Third, the committee designated
exact target goals for 1) the quantities produced of four types of rubber,
2) the number, sizes, and completion dates of plants, and 3) the standard
production techniques. With no goals left indefinite, they established
11
a firm baseline for measuring production success. Fourth, in order to
maximize the likelihood of high levels of outputs, the committee recommend-
ed the use of tested (as opposed to experimental) production techniques.
Of course, production decision-making was more greatly centralized in
Washington during World War II than today.
Decisions were made not on resource prices (many of which were ar-
tifically fixed) but on physical constraints. In fact, a simple "gap
analysis"--concerned exclusively with physical flows of synthetic and nat-
ural rubber--served as the basis for production and allocation decisions.
The government controlled prices of input factors (both capital and labor)
and products of the rubber industry (and all other major industries). A
market analysis--concerned with prices of rubber products, operating and
capital costs of competing technologies--was not then made. This type of
analysis would have required a large number of adjustments of controlled
costs and prices to reflect "real" economic value.
After the war, the following arguments (among others) were presented
for protecting the synthetic rubber industry:
1) to insure supplies of strategic materials,
2) to avoid junking existing plants,
3) to promote full employment,
4) to lower dependence on foreign supplies potentially subject to
monopoly control, and
5) to achieve stable prices through an increased domestic supply.
These arguments were open to great debate, dependent on different inter-
pretations of postwar rubber (natural and synthetic) market conditions.
Some of these arguments bear striking resemblence to current arguments in
favor of Project Independence.
12
In evaluating the validity of the arguments, one needs first to look
at the actual (very small) and anticipated (rather large) differences in
synthetic and natural rubber production costs. (The difficulty of deter-
mining costs for synthetic rubber will be discussed later). What premium
should domestic and military users have paid for the assurance of synthetic
supplies? Second, one needs to examine the financing of plant reconver-
sions from military to civilian production. Was there a "sunk cost fallacy"
in attempting to maintain plants with a negative net social value? Third,
the impacts of regional unemployment seemed to affect national production
planning. Who should have borne the burden of labor displacements in closing
plants? Fourth, there seemed little concrete evidence of a strong foreign
cartel building in the late 1940's. The U.S. was in an extraordinarily
dominent position in world trade (with a highly favorable balance of pay-
ments). Subsidizing inefficient synthetic rubber only slightly benefited
rubber consumers, but did so at a cost to both American taxpayers and
foreign producers.
3. Implementation
Inherent in any government program of 15 years' duration are evolving
plans and organizations to execute those plans. The Baruch Committee in
1942 set definite goals for implementing the construction of synthetic
13
rubber plants, which had lagged behind schedule in the past year. 3 The
Truman Committee in the same year sharply criticized the initial pilot
construction of four 2,500 long-ton capacity plants (later increased to
10,000 for the "Big 4" rubber companies (Goodyear, Goodrich, Firestone,
and U.S. Rubber)): "Lack of unified responsibility resulted in a failure
to meet situations as they arose with the resultant failure to set a
13
I
definitive goal at an early date, failure to provide adequately for pro-
duction of new materials, and failure to transform engineering plans into
construction obs.1 4
There were three separate government boards responsible for plant
construction in 1941: the Production Management Board (later the War Pro-
duction Board), the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Office of
the Petroleum Coordinator. The Baruch Committee, however, recommended the
establishment of a single agency--to be accountable for all supply and de-
mand decisions related to natural and synthetic rubber.
The rubber "czar" William Jeffers faced few technological problems, but
rather processing problems of putting equipment from various sources to-
gether. There was general agreement that companies were sharing infor-
mation after the patent agreements of 1941 and 1942: "In fact the com-
panies that know the methods to be adopted are coorperating whole-
heartedly in the assistance to getting together information so that it
"15
can be generally given to the industry for whatever it can produce.15
However, careful examination of Table 1 will reveal important dis-
tinctions between targeted goals and actual capacity in 1944. The thiokol
rubber production facility was completely curtailed in 1943. Actual U.S.
Buna-S capacity in 1944 was 705,000 long tons as compared to 845,000 planned.
The vast majority of butadiene in 1943 and 1944 was produced from alcohol
plants--operating at twice the planned capacity--not petroleum plants of
larger planned capacity. Certainly in examining completed government pro-
grams a bias is introduced if one overlooks risks percieved at the time
14
TABLE 1
INTENDED AND ACTUAL 1944 U.S. ANNUAL PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
SYNTHETIC RUBBER (long tons)
INTENDED BY BARUCH REPORT
845,000
132,000
69,000
60,000
1,106,000
ACTUAL 1944
705,000
68,000
63,000
836,000
836 ,000
BUTADIENE (short tons)
INTENDED BY BARUCH REPORT ACTUAL 1944
1) FROM GRAIN
OR ALCOHOL 247,000 230,000
2) FROM BUTANE 60,000 75,000
3) FROM BUTYLENE 250,000 250,000
4) FROM NAPHTHA 125,000 37,000
5) FROM 3 AND 4 85,000 55,000
6) FROM NATURAL GAS
BY ALDOL - 10,000
TOTAL 767,000 657,600
BUNA-S
BUTYL
NEOPRENE
THIOKOL
TOTAL
-
- -
15
and ignores differences in the success of programs at different times.
One might agree with Robert Solo in his assessment that the synthetic rub-
ber program failed to produce adequate quantities of materials in the single
war year 1943.16
As a general pattern, government investments in expanded production
were based on the following considerations: 1) the probable adaptability
of the final product as a replacement of scarce products, and 2) the
state of development and industrial timetables of needs, and 3) estimated
17
construction time of plants. J.H. Krug, Director of the U.S. War Pro-
duction Board, outlined general principles for government control of pro-
duction under the operation of private firms: 1) the power to contract is
equivalent to the power to control; 2) simple controls designed within
current business practices work most effectively; 3) new accounting systems,
distinct from routine private company accounts, ought to be established;
4) authorities for different industries must bargain with each other for
scarce resources; and 5) total overall output as opposed to short term, sec-
tional output, should be maximized.1 8
The striking feature of the postwar operations of the synthetic rub-
ber industry was the nine year lag from 1945 until 1954 in implementing
the disposal of the majority of plants. The Inter-Agency Policy Committee
on Rubber executed a series of small plant sales from 1946 to 1949, without
a strong commitment to a particular future structure of the sectors of the
synthetic rubber industry. After the Rubber Act of 1948 established the firm
policy of disposal of plants, there were two delays in 1949 and 1952
(caused by increased military demands for the Korean War) before actual dis-
posal in 1954. The Steelman Report of 1950, prepared by the Assistant to
16
the President for the Congress, suggested financing schemes, bid solicita-
tion procedures, and guidelines for the market structure of future syn-
thetic rubber markets. None of these were adopted by the Rubber Facilities
Disposal Commission.
4. Financing Schemes and Cost Accounting Procedures
The government did a minimum of experimentation with alternative
financing schemes and cost accounting procedures within the rubber pro-
gram. During most of the war, prices did not operate to equate supply and
demand in markets for raw materials, physical capital and labor. The pro-
ductive resources were allocated to meet centrally determined production
quotas. According to J.A. Krug of the War Production Board:
Over a large area of production, the decision as to what
should be produced, who should produce it and to whom it
could be sold were government decisions. Prices and
wages were controlled by government and government help-
ed guide the movement of labor from plant to plant from
industry to industry, and from region to region. 1
Without doubt the social value of scarce resources vastly exceeded their
market prices. In particular, synthetic rubber had a value in 1943 far in
excess of its nominal price. Further, the investment in the construction of
rubber plants and in their operation had extremely high opportunity costs in
production foregone elsewhere.
There appeared to be virtually no debate in 1941 to 1942 about the govern-
ment paying the full cost of constructing and operating all but a very few
specialized plants (neoprene and styrene which were previously constructed).
Either there were no perceived profit opportunities for private firms in
synthetic rubber production or the opportunities were dominated by the
cost plus fixed-fee operating contracts of the government. The steel in-
17
dustry would provide potentially a better example than the synthetic rubber
industry of shared public and private financing.
In 1944, the Office of the Rubber Director reported on the costs of in-
20
divudual plants. Despite the elaborateness of the breakdown of invest-
ment and operation costs, one can derive little relevant information con-
cerning real comparative costs (measured in social values, not nominal prices)
of different processes and different companies using the same processes.
A variety of tables, based on different input prices, were also calculated to
estimate expected postwar production costs. These tables estimate only out-
of-pocket costs without depreciation, sales expense, profits, or interest on
investments. In the 1950 Steelman Report profit and loss statements for
average plants (similar to those for a private firm) were estimated (assuming
21
10% annual depreciation and 1 7/8% interest). Again these figures supply
very little useful information, especially without the accounts (not readily
available) of the private operating firms. Interestingly, the profit and loss
statements were formulated to approximate those of privately owned synthetic
rubber plants under competitive market conditions. However, the rubber at this
time had government price setting, output setting, specification requirements,
and guaranteed sales levels (all of these regulations were not actually
binding restraints). Further, the accounts do not include royalty charges,
research and development expenses, sales and distributive costs and profits.
The Steelman Report did, however, suggest imaginative financial in-
centive schemes to attract small firms to purchase plants at disposal.
The actual purchase arrangements in 1954, full cash payments or 25% cash
downpayment with 10% annual equal payments, did not include the following
innovative plans suggested four years previously: 1) installment payments
18
with unlimited walkout privileges, 2) functional payments adjusted to per-
centage capacity at which plants operated, 3) price discrimination for
selling prices, and 4) combinations of flexible credit, low interest rates,
22
and small down payments.
5. Incentive Schemes to Encourage Operating Efficiency and
Sale of Plants
As indicated in the section on financial incentive schemes, directors
of the synthetic rubber program were less than imaginative in implementing
incentive programs for efficient management of plants by the private operating
firms. During World War II, there was little discussion of government-imposed
devices to explicitly motivate private firms to minimize costs. All govern-
ment raw materials and capital equipment were distributed under very tight
control. Presumably given the scarcity of resources and the unambiguously
enthusiastic ideological support of the war might have been expected not to
intentially pad costs or falsify output records.
However, after the war, writers have to search much harder for incentives
for operators of plants to minimize costs and direct efforts to the most effec-
tive goals. Robert Solo, a commentator on the synthetic rubber industry,
suggested two self-regulatory motives for operating companies after the war:
1) they would as a matter of pride want their costs to equal other opera-
tors', and 2) they would presume subsequent purchase of their (hopefully
23
efficient) plants. 3 It seems hard to imagine how these incentives might
have been compelling. In comparison, the incentives to maintain government
ownership of plants were also powerful: 1) the operating contracts were
profitable to certain (or all) companies, and 2) government ownership pre-
19
vented a change in the market shares of firms in different sectors of the
synthetic rubber industry.
In the Steelman Report of 1950, a lengthy list of alternatives was
considered to insure adequate levels of consumption of synthetic rubber
24
after the disposal of government-owned plants. The Report idendified
the following interested parties in government decisions affecting the
synthetic rubber markets: 1) raw material suppliers (mostly petroleum
after 1944) for synthetic rubber, 2) producers of synthetic rubber (four
kinds), 3) natural rubber suppliers, 4) manufacturers of rubber final goods,
5) consumers of rubber final goods, and 6) general taxpayers. The report
considered seriously several alternatives with benefits and costs to several
groups. First, a tariff on imports of natural rubber would increase synthetic
rubber consumption. However, the tariff would need frequent revision to
adjust synthetic rubber prices to changing natural prices (given the his-
tory of fluctuating natural rubber prices). Also, consumers and natural
rubber producers would be forced to bear the full burden of costs. Sec-
ond, mandatory purchase of quantities of synthetic rubber by manufacturers
of final rubber products would guarantee consumption levels. Presumably
this plan could result (if it were effective) in a two-tiered market for
each of the four types of synthetic rubber--with one price for mandatory
purchases of synthetic rubber, and a second (lower) price for rubber redis-
tributed among the final goods firms. Third, the government could make
specifications for the mix of natural and synthetic rubber in particular
rubber products. This plan would demand the most direct control by the
government (and the most complicated enforcement) and would potentially
produce undesirable shifts in product lines. Fourth, subsidies could be
20
payed directly to synthetic rubber producers, to the benefits of consumers
and the cost of taxpayers.
The government decided in the period from 1945 to 1955 1) to maintain
ownership of the plants, 2) to control prices of synthetic rubber (which
stayed below natural rubber prices for the most part), 3) to guarantee
minimum levels of purchases of synthetic rubber, and 4) to specify minimum
ratios of synthetics to natural rubber in certain products. Notably the
latter two government controls proved to be unnecessary in maintaining syn-
thetic rubber production. These multiple controls, in a market dominated
by government ownership, prevented a clear assessment of "real costs" for
synthetic rubber and final rubber goods. Significantly, government in-
terventions into private synthetic rubber market were curtailed after the
disposal of plants in 1954.
6. Patent Arrangements and Research and Development Programs
Throughout the fifteen year period of active government participation
in the synthetic rubber industry (from 1941-1955), there was substantial
debate about the handling of patent exchanges between operating firms, and on
the best designs for government supported research and development. The
Steelman report outlined the usual government procedures (not followed in
1941) to examine patents before supporting a new industry: 1) extensive
seaches are conducted for all patents relevant to operations, 2) validity
of application of patents are checked, 3) operations are examined to deter-
mine whether they impinge on patents, and 4) separate licenses are negotiated
for the operation of each plant.2 5
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Instead, the government in 1941 called together all U.S. companies
which were presumed to have knowledge of relevant production processes.
One firm, Standard Oil of New Jersey, had acquired the U.S. patent rights
for Buna-S, Buna-N (a general purpose rubber not developed commercially
until the mid-1950's) and Butyl rubber in 1939 from the German firm I.G.
Farben (in exchange for petroleum processing patents). Thurman Arnold
of the Justice Department, one of many Standard Oil's critics, brought
suit against the firm for cartel arrangement with I.G. Farben to di-
vide international markets. The Truman Committee, a Congressional
Committee investigating synthetic rubber, in 1942 identified the issue
of divergence between a private firm's objective function (profit maxi-
mization of market values) and the national objective function (to maxi-
mize immdiate synthetic rubber production):
It suffices that the record indicates the possibility that
in important areas of international business relationships
and/or basic industrial decision-making, there have have
been in this instance, and that there might be general
divergences between the legitimate commerical criterion
of business aion and the interests of national security
and survival. 
Certainly in 1941 Standard Oil possessed the patents, technology, research,
and funds to initiate on a large scale production of synthetic rubber (in
particular Buna-S and Butyl). Instead of pursuing an immediate profit
opportunity--investing in production facilities--they threatened a suit
against Goodrich and Goodyear in 1941 (which intended to produce syn-
thetic rubber) to preserve a future profit opportunity. Again the Truman
Committee identified these actions as in restraint of production: "Standard
is only one of a group of companies producing critical materials which,
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by cartel agreements and by the subsequent control of patents, have
sought to restrict and control production."
Beginning in 1941, the government, through the Rubber Reserve Company,
brought companies together to arrange patent exchange agreements. Gen-
erally, the agreements (signed in 1941 and 1942) paid small royalties to
firms previously possessing patent rights, but required the pooling of all
new patents until 1948. The exact contracts varied across sectors of
the synthetic rubber industry.
The Baruch Committee set two not entirely harmonious goals for maximum
flow of information among firms and maximum competition in research and
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development advances. With a free flow of information, firms would
not be able--in an exclusive sense--to capitalize their research gains
into new operating techniques. Particularly in the postwar period,
firms with cost-plus-fixed-fee unit operating contracts had no incentives
to reduce costs (and perhaps disincentives in order to maintain manage-
ment fees). There was no reason for these firms to necessarily share the
national objectives of increased U.S. independence in rubber supplies
and increased competitiveness of synthetic rubber products. In fact,
Robert Solo argued persuasively for a government bureaucrat, accountable
for achieving those national objectives, to manage the research and de-
velopment programs: "It is the lesson that any research and development
program must be directed and run by a technically competent and responsible
authority who stands accountable for the results, and whose position and
reputation and/or monetary reward depend directly on the failure or success
of that program."2 8
To judge the performance of government supported R&D, one must look
at the entire portfolio of investments. From 1940 to 1949 the government
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invested $23 million in R&D -- $2 million to research institutes, $7.5
million to universities, and $13 to private frims. Again Robert Solo
argued that in the period from 1948 (after the end of patent pooling ex-
cept for government sponsored R&D) to 1954 (at the disposal of plants)
major technical innovations were achieved by a small number of firms
not on government research grants. Specifically, private research led
to developments in cold resistent butyl, cold rubber processing, and black
master batch. The success of these projects coincided with the commercial
self-interests of the companies. Particularly in an industry dominated
by government-owned plants, operators cannot be expected to generate in-
novations whose rewards they cannot internalize.
7. The Competitive Environments and Market Structures of the Industrial
Sectors
During World War II, the industrial environment surrounding synthetic
rubber production was characterized by emergency government controls. Re-
lated industries were closely regulated by the government and the government
owned a horizontally and in part vertically integrated group of synthetic rub-
ber production plants (although it did not own suppliers of raw materials
or final product plants).
Soon after the war, however, economic conditions changed, which could
potentially have allowed the transfer of plants to private ownership. De-
spite the considerable funds already invested by the government in plant and
equipment, potential private purchasers of existing (or future) plants were
faced with important sources of uncertainty.
In the late 1940's the state of technology in Buna-S (general purpose)
rubber allowed it to substitute for natural rubber (or a mixture with it)
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in most products. Neoprene and butyl had specialized uses, in which they
were actually superior to natural rubber. However, the costs of producing
these products (barring a technical breakthrough) and the prices at which
their sales were set, could be expected to exceed natural rubber prices
(which were rumored to drop to $ .10/lb.).
In fact, the demand for Buna-S rubber for general use could have
decreased drastically, if a price gap formed between cheap natural rubber
and more expensive synthetic. The second area of uncertainty concerned
the government's actions in the future synthetic rubber market. In par-
ticular, would the government continue to insure profitable operation of
plants it no longer owned? Would the removal of guaranteed levels of pur-
chases of different types of synthetic (buna-S, neoprene and butyl) rubber,
on one hand, cause large stockpile of certain types to form, or, on the other
hand, reduce the number of producers, such that production might not meet
future national security needs? As it happened plants providing 25% of
the 1945 production capacity were sold to their respective operating com-
panies, and continued to produce (presumably quite profitably with strong
demand for their products) at high levels. With price setting, patent
pooling, and specification requirements, there were no shocks to the opera-
tion or changes in the structure of the synthetic rubber markets resulting
from the transfers of plants to private ownership before 1954.
The Disposal Committee had a pair of criteria in establishing private
competitive markets in the synthetic rubber sectors in 1954:
That the disposal program be designed best to afford small business
enterprises and users, other than the purchaser of a facility, the
opportunity to obtain a fair share of the end products of the fac-
ilities sold and at fair prices;
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That the recommended sales shall provide for the development
within the United States of a free, competitive, synthetic
rubber industry, and do not permit any person to possess
unreasonable control over the manufacture of synthetic rub-
ber or its component materials. 29
Within these criteria, the Disposal Committee achieved a variety of
sectoral solutions: the two butyl plants were both sold to Standard Oil of
New Jersey (the current operator) without alternative bids offered. In a
lame attempt to promote competition, the committee included in one contract
the option to require the sale of one plant after three years if a bidder
arose. The lone styrene plant (12% of the industry capacity) had numerous
bidders and was sold to Shell Oil Company, also the purchaser of buna-S
and butadiene plants at the same location in California. The non-operating
alcohol butadiene plant was sold at a nominal price to a single bidder.
The critical market structure of decisions occurred in the petroleum
butadiene and buna-S sectors. Five of the eight plants sold in each sector
were purchased by single companies in pairs of butadiene and buna-S plants.
These firms had a competitive advantage in vertically integrating the two
processes. In the petroleum butadiene sector almost half the production
capacity was purchased by a pair of integrated oil companies (Goodrich-
Gulf and Texas-U.S. Chemical). In the buna-S sector the "Big 4" rubber
companies also purchased about 50% of the capacity.
Clearly the Disposal Committee made some compromises and some default
decisions (due to no bidders) in tolerating the vertical integration of
raw materials suppliers, synthetic rubber producers, and rubber manufac-
turers. The Disposal Committee also traded competitive structures which
might have offered long-term benefits to consumers for receipts of sale
(from a limited number of bidders) of immediate benefit to taxpayers.
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8. Conclusions
Certain quite general lessons from the synthetic rubber experience are
applicable to today's energy commercialization projects. First, decisions
have impacts over a much longer period than the planning horizons within
which they are made. There is remarkable stability in the structure of
the rubber industry in the twenty year period from 1941 to 1961. This
stability resulted largely from the favorable coincidence of the goal of
maximizing synthetic rubber production during World War II and the long-
term goal of establishing a permanent post-war industry. The single cri-
terion (derived from "gap analysis") of production levels can be applied to
the war-time rubber program. Did physical production meet in an absolute
sense emergency needs? Yes it did, although it lagged behind intended out-
put. The post-war government support of the synthetic rubber industry
offers greater difficulties to analysts of benefits and costs. Despite
the numerous records of nominal investment and operative costs, one cannot
determine definitely the net economic benefits of the program even with
the best estimates of "real values" on inputs and outputs. Further, the
synthetic rubber program does not offer evidence as to comparative costs
of production between government and privately owned plants. Measures of
effectiveness of private operators and government directors are difficult to
establish.
Second, an industry is really a combination of separate sectors. Over-
all goals should be set and programs coordinated in separate sectors. Dur-
ing World War II there were primarily logistical problems of coordinating
production under emergency conditions. General lessons derived from this
experience concerning the implementation of a program might include: 1)
the usefulness of exact production targets, construction deadlines, and
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scheduling of inputs; 2) the need for an assertive single overseer of pro-
duction, distribution, and conservation of a product; and 3) the necessity
of well controlled information processing systems (today supported by com-
puters) to file accurate individual reports from companies.
After the war, problems focused about the application of controls and
supports to separate sectors of the industry. In order to be effective,
price controls, guarantees of purchases, and material mix specifications
required detailed knowledge of all stages of the production process. This
type of government intervention into the market must be flexible enough to
respond to new market conditions--in particular, to changes in prices of sub-
stitute raw materials and alternative technical processes. Certainly the
cost-plus-fixed-fee financial arrangement for operating firms offers (with-
out other controls) no built-in incentives to lower costs. There was, in
fact, some evidence in the early 1950's that government-supported research and
development was less effective than private efforts. Again certain lessons
are evident. The weakness of government-supported R&D is most likely not
in basic research, but in implementation techniques of research discoveries.
There is no strong substitute for the market mechanism in allocating resources
to different research projects. The government direction of R&D must have a
clear concept of national objectives and must transmit target expectations to
contracted researchers (in particular private firms with different incentives)
which will meet these objectives.
Third, the relative mix of government and private efforts in an initially
government-supported industry must evolve over time with changing economic
conditions. Although the synthetic rubber program had frightfully little
lead time in developing replacement supplies for natural rubber, the program
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had an extremely lengthy lag time in disposing of plants and establishing a
privately owned and operated industry. One might account for the delay in
plant disposal from 1941 until 1954 in several ways: 1) the program was
justified in part to insure national security, the value of which does not
easily translate into nominal costs and benefits, and specific criteria for
program design; 2) inertia built up among special interest groups, which
benefited from the government's on-going expenditures--the operating con-
tracts must have been profitable; 3) there was evidence of proprietary know-
ledge on the part of individual operating firms about their plants--precluding
competitiion from other firms for purchase of these plants. Perhaps the
dominant lesson from the synthetic rubber experience might be the difficulty
of effecting a transition from government ownership of plants to private
ownership. The synthetic rubber program offers only examples of 1) multiple
government controls in non-competitive markets (1941-1954), and 2) virtually
no controls in privately established (relatively competitive) markets (post
1954). Energy planners must look elsewhere for examples of government and pri-
vately owned firms competing in relatively less controlled markets.
Finally, the crucial difference between government support for commerciali-
zation of new technologies under conditons of wartime and peace must be em-
phasized. During World War II our economy bordered on being centrally plan-
ned. Needs for rubber were calculated at levels necessary to support pro-
duction of necessary industrial material, and strong measures were taken
to restrict consumption of rubber by consumers. While managers attempted
to run the program at minimum cost, cost considerations were strictly second-
ary to meeting targeted needs. The Japanese cut-off, combined with the de-
fense build-up, had produced a "gap" which had to be filled. The situation
today is very different. New energy technologies must ultimately compete in
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a marketplace on the basis of their economics. While the government may
influence this economics, with taxes or subsidies, it seems unlikely that
physical constraints (analogous to the requirements for minimum syn-
thetic/natural rubber ratios in inputs to industrial processes) will be used.
Nor will the government buy at any price in order to fill a gap. Thus,
new energy technologies must be carefully evaluated to see whether, in the
expected economic environment of the future, they will be competitive. The
sense of urgency in World War II overrode the economics, the "energy crisis"
does not seem to have that power. Therefore, at its core, the widely cited
analogy between government-supported programs for synthetic rubber and syn-
thetic fuels does not apply.
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